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1 A musical piece is called polyphone if created by multiple voices each pursuing a melodic
line, sounding in accord. Through interplay and coordination of these different voices the
intended audible outcome is composed. If performing a polyphone piece can itself be a
group action (involving more than one player),  I  want to see how far this  notion of
polyphony carries as a metaphor for group agency, in general. The concept of polyphony,
I argue, can make a philosophical account of human agency, especially group agency,
more comprehensive. I briefly sketch what could be regained for the theory of music,
especially the investigation of the origins of musical polyphony, from an application of
the term to action theory: the ability to hear polyphone sounds and “make meaning” of
them points to the general ability of the human observer to focus her attention from the
perception of a single voice to a perception of multiple voices,  or from single agent-
causation  to  group-actions.  This  I-mode/we-mode  perception is  implemented  in  the
biological  background.  It  is  trained  and  developed  normatively  through the  cultural
background.  Perception of  polyphony thus  already indicates  our  particular  ability  to
impose norms collectively.
2 In  a  theory  of  action,  the  intentional  stance  marks  the  difference  between  actions
performed by different agents independently and different actions “adding up” to an
overall  group-action.  Understanding  collective  intentionality  in  acting  means
understanding the right kind of causation due to the right kind of intention. I show how
actions can be described as polyphone either by describing the intentional stance of the
agents – the action is we-intended, or by characterizing the action as one that has to be
performed by two or more agents. Taking into account these two possible descriptions, I
stipulate two things about agency:
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3 –  that  understanding  and  self-imposing  normativity  on  actions  is  based  in  an
understanding of collective intentionality in general and 
4 – that linguistic agency (making meaning) is constituted by such an understanding, as
well.
5 A  discussion  of  polyphony  clarifies  how  different  forms  of  proto-normativity  are
constituted,  such as commitment to procedures (finishing a course of  action) and an
expectation of brute fact normalcy, and how they relate to the general ability to hear
music. If music is developed from a perception of the natural world, I suggest for an
understanding of the origins of polyphony in music to look towards the “natural world”
of human interaction as potentially polyphone in structure.1
 
Describing Group-Agency as Polyphone 
6 Actions can be understood as different from behavior in that the agent is free to perform
the action or refrain from acting. Agency describes the intentional stance of the agent,
not any physical movement. If there is a force binding the agent, we will not characterize
her  (albeit:  causal)  involvement  in  the event  as  agential.  For  example,  if  I  open the
window at gunpoint, or you raise my arm in an auction and I make a bid, we won’t say
that I voluntarily opened the window or bought that painting. I won’t count as an agent
in the full sense. A single agent’s participation in group efforts has to be agential in the
same sense of being free, otherwise we won’t characterize her involvement in the group-
action as full agency. Yet, what kind of intentions does the agent need to hold to perform
in a group? How can she share intentions, or as prerequisite, join attention with others?
Furthermore, looking at the (mostly unpleasant) side-effects of our ability to perform
together, at accidental patterns and outcomes such as man-made draught or systemic
discrimination, at intended actions with consequences for which no single agent seems to
be responsible such as corporations polluting rivers, or at systems constituting group
actions that may not be based on any sharing of intentions such as market capitalism, we
see that a better understanding of agency in groups is necessary for a clarification of
these cases and a fair attribution of responsibility.
7 I  suggest  describing  group-agency  as  polyphone,  homophone  or  monophone.2
Introducing this terminology has the benefit and limitation of giving us access to the
phenomenon first through a metaphor. Polyphone melodies consist of several “equal”
voices constituting the piece.  Relating the metaphor,  if  the group-members hold we-
intentions  that  motivate  their  further  intentions  and  bodily movements,  this  might
constitute a polyphone action. For example, my playing my part of the Bach-Sonata in our
string quartet could be described as polyphone action, because I hold the suitable we-
intentions; my action is motivated by my intention that “we-play-the-Sonata”.3 An action
would be monophone if performed alone and involving only I-intentions directed at my
reaching my goal. For example, if I am alone in my room practicing my part of the Sonata.
An action would be called homophone if some participants are only helping an agent reach
her goal, where, again, only I-intentions are involved, this time some of them directed
towards someone else reaching her goal. For example, if I practice my part and you help
me by turning the pages of my sheet music, we both hold I-intentions, but yours are
directed to assist my goal. That is, in cases of monophone or homophone actions there are
no proper we-intentions motivating the action, the participants are not in “pro-group
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we-mode”  (Tuomela).  The  polyphony  described  is  on  the  level  of  the  intentions
motivating the action, not on the level of the concrete result of the action. Whether such
we-intentions are present isn’t to be decided for all members of the group performing,
but for each of them individually. Equally, it has to be decided for each instance of a
potentially polyphone action (on token level). It could be that in some cases the agents
hold we-intentions, but in some other cases the agents don’t. The same outcome, the
same  observable  event  in  the  world,  might  count as  polyphone,  monophone  or
homophone action depending on the intentions held by the agents. Consider as example
three different versions of reaching the same outcome: If we play a Bach piece together,
or if I play all voices of the polyphone piece myself one after the other for a recording, or
if per chance you perform and I perform alone at home and the passer-by on the street
hears Bach and stops to listen, each time the audible event will be polyphone on the level
of music, yet, polyphone on the level of action only in the first case, monophone in the
others.
8 Alternatively, we could also think of polyphone actions as those that are only possible for
several agents performing together, such as playing a symphony or a game of soccer.
Then,  polyphony describes  the action itself,  not  the intentional  states  of  the agents.
Introducing polyphony as a term helps illuminate how the two descriptions are linked for
the individual agent. Knowing that and how some actions are only possible with others is
a prerequisite for we-intending and pro-group we mode. Actions possible only as group-
efforts aren’t limited to games or actions with constitutive-rule-structures, nor actions
constituting  deontic  rights-duty-obligations.  Yet,  in  actions  in  games,  following
constitutive  rules,  or  enforcing  deontic  structures  it  is  most  evident  that  the  other
participants aren’t simply used as means to an ultimately individualistic end. Polyphony
then describes a)  that actions are we-intended,  b) that they are only possible as we-
intended actions, and c) that the agents are aware of this fact.
9 There are two main differences between the perception of polyphony in music and the
analysis of actions as polyphone: first, an action originating as a group effort does not
have to consist of several actions performed at the same time. We can make the plan to
compose a symphony together where I will write the first movement and you will write
the second and so on. We will take turns, this might take months at a time and no action
is performed simultaneously with any other since they depend for their performance on
the completion of the previous action. The we-intending of the single group members,
not the simultaneity of several actions defines the specific difference of group-actions. A
discussion  of  the  concept  of  polyphony  in  music  might  reflect  this  point,  though
polyphony is a quality attributed musical pieces which are typically heard at one time.
10 Secondly, any and all sounds surrounding a listener, let us say: the human ear, can be
heard, that is, understood, as creating a polyphone multi-melodic musical piece together.
Like all functions imposed by an observer, the discreteness of the object – in this case: the
multi-layered  melodic  texture  of  sounds  making  up  one  overarching  “melody”  -  is
imposed by her as well. So, in a way, the perceived melody is “up to the listener” whereas
whether an action is or isn’t a we-intended action is not up to the observer, but up to the
agents performing.
11 The metaphor of polyphony reaches its limits where polyphony as a quality of music can
be part of a single composer’s strategy, but polyphony in action always characterizes we-
intentional states and/or actions (necessarily) performed by more than one person.
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12 To summarize: The concept of polyphony for action theory might help us understand how
the intentions of the agents and the action itself can be characterized as polyphone. This,
in turn, suggests that the agents themselves must exhibit an awareness of a certain form
of  normativity  that  is  implied by polyphony in the sense used above to  successfully
perform polyphone actions. I will now use this stipulation to propose a way of accounting
for agency that links up to this idea of polyphone actions, yet retains the premise that all
actions, single or group actions, bottom out in individuals’ mental states, that there are
nothing but individual mental states motivating actions (a premise sometimes referred to
as  “methodological  individualism”4).  Based  in  an  understanding  of  polyphony  as  a
normative awareness of agents, I suggest a normative account of group agency.
13 There are three different ways of accounting for agency while maintaining the premise of
methodological  individualism.  Among  the  methodological  individualists,  we  find
descriptive accounts of single agency as basic (such as Meggle’s), descriptive accounts of
group agency as primitive (such as Searle’s) and normative accounts for single agents
(such as Korsgaard’s). The descriptive account of single agency as basic denies the existence
of we-intentions altogether and claims that all  group-actions can be reconstructed as
consisting  of  I-intentions  together  with  mutual  beliefs.  In  opposition,  the  descriptive
account  of  group  agency  as  primitive  claims  that  we-intentions  are  not  reducible  to  I-
intentions  with  mutual  beliefs  while,  conforming  to  the  premise  of  methodological
individualism,  it  states  that  we-intentions  are  in  the  heads  of  the  individual  agents
performing together.  Here,  I  will  not discuss the merits  and difficulties of  these two
accounts. I label both of them descriptive accounts because they stand in opposition to the
existing normative accounts.  They maintain that for the agent agency is like any other
biologically rooted phenomenon, that agency is for the agent something like vision or
digestion. Just as the agent sees due to corresponding visual states, the agent acts if she
has the right corresponding intentional states. Normative accounts, in contrast, believe
that  someone  counts  as  an agent  not  simply  by  means  of  the  correct  intentional
motivational state, but that the agent has to self-constitute, that is, impose normative
restrictions on her own behavior. The descriptive accounts assume that someone is an
agent in acting, whereas normative accounts think of someone as becoming an agent in
setting standards for her actions.
14 Korsgaard shows a way from a Kantian, normative self-constitution to the world of others
in a public sphere, but she assumes that the individual does not need the other in order to
self-constitute in the first place. Existentialist thought originates from just this dilemma:
that the self should be free to constitute itself, but that, at the same time, it is bound to
the world of others for its very constitution (that is: not free). Sartre’s reflexive self, for
example, needs the gaze of the other to grasp itself as existing and in order to put the two
modes of the self (reflecting and existing) together, again, we need to, at least, imagine
the other as present and as consciousness,  as world-shaping agent.  Inspired by these
analyses and convinced of the relevance and truth of their observation, but aware of their
status of remaining stuck between the rock of individual freedom and the hard place of
our need for others for this freedom, I want to propose an account of group agency as
normative.  This  entails  keeping  methodological  individualism  as  a  premise  and
understanding agency as constituted by the agent (much as Korsgaard’s agent) through
self-imposed normative standards, but introducing the dependency of this constitution
upon the realization of the importance of others for the understanding of normativity. If
to perform polyphone actions the agent has to have a basic  (possibly tacit)  sense of
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group-originating normativity,  a normative account of group agency is in order.  Yet,
doesn’t the agent just perform with others without ever thinking or reflecting about her
need of these others for her self-constitution? Putting herself together as an agent is
something that the agent does “naturally”, yet, upon closer inspection, we find that what
appears natural is in fact part of a culturally learned and trained ability, one that was
biologically given, but shaped through (cultural, linguistic) interaction with others. The
concept of polyphony as the ability to perceive single voice and multi-voice melodies,
single or multi-agent action reflects our self-constitution through others.
 
The Common Ground: Normativity and Linguistic
Agency
15 What kind of normativity or normative standards does the individual need to grasp in
order to become an agent and how are these normative standards linked to collectivity?
Any  agent  needs  to  be  able  to  disambiguate  contexts  in  order  to  act;  this  involves
understanding contexts and also understanding some contexts as “normal”. Animals and
humans alike are able to perceive a certain “brute fact normalcy”, and will be ill at ease in
a situation that varies wildly from their expectation of normalcy.  This expectation is
quite independent of collective constitution. A solitary cat will feel it as well as a dog in a
pack,  as  well  as  myself.  Secondly,  there  is  a  proto-normativity  that  comes  from  a
commitment to a course of action. It is implied not so much by the logic of going through
with what I have begun (as Searle has suggested) where it would be too costly to abandon
a course of action. Rather, it has to do with the logic of complying with the “right way of
doing” what I have chosen to do. If I want to play piano, I typically use my fingers, not a
bow, for example (though it is conceivable that I would do so). This procedural proto-
normativity is independent of collective constitution, as well.  There are forms of full
agency  that  can  be  described  independently  of  any  form  of  collectively  constituted
normativity. In the case of a rupture in the expectation of brute fact normalcy, any of us
(the cat,  the dog,  myself)  might just run in a panic.  Single agency is  independent of
collectively imposed norms where just  procedural  considerations are concerned.  Yet,
there is a third form of normativity that is  dependent on collective constitution and
awareness thereof. I will call this form “linguistic” normativity and the agency that it
affords “linguistic” agency. It  comes with understanding that some signs as naturally
meaningful and that some signs as non-naturally meaningful, a distinction introduced
into  the  literature  by  Grice.  It  is  based  in  an  understanding  of  what  it  means  to
communicate,  to  impose  meaning  on  arbitrary  signs  to  get  someone  to  understand
because they understand that this is what I am trying to do. I think we can tell the story of
the perception of this difference from the point of view of the child who learns to see
what her mother shows her (whereas her dog will never learn that). Equally, she learns
what it means to go through with an action, but also learns what it means to act following
rules because the action in question wouldn’t be possible without the rules. She and her
dog will go on walks together, but they will never play chess together. She will also come
to know that some actions require the help of others, some are only possible if performed
together with others.  Self-imposed normativity in acting is  a result  of  understanding
these  different  possible  forms  of  acting  and  linguistic  agency.  It  is  dependant  on
understanding communicative structures and collectively imposed normativity.
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Origins of Polyphony
16 This essay is titled somewhat extraordinarily “the Sound of Power”. I will now give an
explanation of this title. I have asked myself if music is meaningful for me in terms of a
(non-linguistic)  experience,  or  rather  than meaningful  for  us,  that  is,  conventionally
meaningful; is it meaningful for me, as “music of the spheres”, or is it culturally coded
and conditioned? Listeners testify to both. They appreciate music on a deeply personal
level that goes beyond mediation to others. It is a solipsistic or private joy. But there is
also  evidence  that  what  kind  of  music  one  likes  depends  on  one’s  culture,  and
furthermore,  lovers of music appreciate experiencing music with others,  as part of a
tradition,  and they judge it  according to the norms of  the canon that  the composer
belongs to.
17 If I am able to perceive different sounds reaching my ear in progression as melodic, as
somehow ordered “meaningfully” and as having a discrete form that distinguishes them
from other sounds surrounding me, what kind of normativity does this entail? Is it the
same normativity as the one that I understand in understanding non-natural signs as
communicative devices of a speaker? Maybe the meaning of music is just “meaning for
me”; maybe experiencing music is not only non-literal, but also not to be paraphrased in
terms of common, conventional meanings, maybe it always touches on the sublime and
relates  us  to  the  grandeur  of  the  world  (like  a  beautiful  sunset,  or  an  awesome
thunderstorm)  more  than  having  a  communicative  aspect  to  it.  The  question  of  its
communicative component applies not only to music, but to all works of art. It is the
question  of  the  conventional  and  author-intentional  aspect  of  meaning  in  artworks.
Walton, for example, claims that works of art don’t have to be intended by anyone to
mean anything, but that the perceiver is the maker of the work of art in question. Walton
doesn’t address the ability to hear music, but it could be a key example for him, since
there are on the surface no transmittable “meanings” to sounds much like there isn’t
meaning  in  this  sense  to  numbers.  It  seems  that  not  only  the  logical  relationships
between numbers, but also the harmonic relationships between musical notes are not
simply communicative in nature. Music is not simply another symbolic code. According to
Walton,  seeing  clouds  as  castles  is  just  an  exercise  of  our  ability  to  pretend as-if.  I
stipulate that pretending as-if is itself an ability that results at least from our nature, if
not  from  our  self-knowledge  as  gregarious,  communicative  and  deonticity  creating
animals. The as-if of children’s games is a mimesis of the structure of social facts. Music
then would be an application of our ability to hear sounds as something else, for example,
or as parts of a melody, and in both cases we would be imposing conditions of satisfaction
upon already existing conditions  of  satisfaction (Searle).  Music  reflects  the linguistic
sphere in that it reflects our ability to impose meaning on sequences of sounds. But, what
does this mean outside of the context of linguistic or conventional meaning? 
 
Polyphone  music  mirrors  our  world,  the  world  constituted  with  others  through our
doings together. It gives us – literally – a sense of power, because hearing single-voice
melodies and polyphone melodies reflects our different abilities  to act  alone or with
others. Other forms of acting together, like dancing together, or playing music together,
can be seen as proto-forms of “linguistic” agency that involves the attribution of rights
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and obligations to the members of the performing group. The perception of polyphony,
one could say, is an expression and the presupposition of our ability to act in concert.
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NOTES
1. I wish to only propose an idea about polyphone music as deeply ingrained in the make-
up of human beings as gregarious and communicative animals, nothing about a historical
type of polyphony in music or its cultural origins.
2. This suggestion is close to Tuomela’s distinction between I-mode, pro-group I-mode
and pro-group we-mode.  I  think it  might  be worth discussing the term “polyphone”
because  it  allows  us  the  dual  description  of  the  agents’  involvement  and  the  event
described.
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3. I largely follow Searle and use his terminology in this description, though, later on, I
wish to suggest an account of group agency that is different from his, in that it accounts
for a normative component that I believe is necessary for a comprehensive description of
agency.
4. For  reasons  of  simplicity,  but  also  reasons  of  strictness  of  the  concept  of  agency
employed which is tied to a strict concept of what it means to act freely I will continue to
support MI as premise. I hope to show that one can still have a comprehensive account of
the world of the agent as socially constructed, that is, take into account the importance of
others for the agent.
ABSTRACTS
This article considers polyphony from an action-theoretical angle. The notion of polyphony can
be used for a comprehensive philosophical account of human agency, especially group agency.
Actions can be described as polyphone either by describing the intentional stance of the agents,
or the action itself  which can only be executed by two or more agents.  Understanding both
aspects sheds light on the question what kind of normativity and knowledge thereof is required
for agents of collective actions. A normative account of group agency is proposed that can take
into  account  this  understanding  of  normativity  that  the  agents  possess  themselves  while
maintaining the premise of methodological individualism. Concerning the origins of polyphony
as musical notion, understanding polyphone structures reflects the human capacity for acting in
concert.
Cet article aborde la polyphonie sous l’angle de la théorie de l’action et propose une comparaison
entre deux domaines – la théorie de la musique et la théorie de l’action. La notion d’« action
polyphone » se définit en tant que métaphore du phénomène de l’intentionnalité collective dans
lequel elle décrit  l’attitude des agents ainsi  que leur action. Un modèle de « constructivisme
pluriel  »  est  suggéré  comme  conservant  les  prémisses  de  l’individualisme  méthodique  pour
comprendre  l’importance  d’autrui  dans  la  formation  du  soi.  Il  est  aussi  question  ici  de  la
normativité  relative  à  la  capacité  à  entendre  la  musique  en  général,  et  la  polyphonie  en
particulier. La compréhension des structures polyphoniques reflète la capacité humaine à « faire
ensemble » dans des cas proto-normatifs, mais également dans des cas déontologiques.
INDEX
Mots-clés: intentionnalité collective, agentivité des groupes, normativité de l’action, origines de
la polyphonie, polyphonie
Keywords: collective intentionality, group agency, normativity of action, origins of polyphony,
polyphony
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